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During 2020, Australia managed the global and systemic COVID-19 
crisis successfully as measured by health and economic indicators. 
It marshalled the government‘s delivery capacity to control the health 
crisis and put in place measures to offset the induced economic and 
social costs. At the same time, the crisis revealed long-standing 
structural weaknesses in a small, democratic, wealthy, and 
economically successful country that raised questions about 
post-COVID resilience and sustainability. This paper examines that 
experience by applying a ―co-production‖ governance model that sees 
success in ―crisis management‖ as the striking of a balance between 
government capacity and its legitimacy in the eyes of its people. 
Lessons are drawn in terms of Australia‘s ability to tackle the ongoing 
transition out of COVID and future crises, by building systemic 
resilience and sustainability. 
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In January 2021, the global count of COVID-19 cases 
across 219 countries topped 103 million, total 
deaths exceeded 2.2 million and countries began to 
struggle with emerging more virulent mutations and 
vaccine rollouts (Worldometers, 2021). Australia 
ranked 8 among nearly 100 countries that 
performed best in the handling of the pandemic 
(Lang & Lemahieu, 2021) with total cases 28,823 and 
total deaths of 909 (Australian Department of 
Health, 2021).  
In contrast, at the time of writing, 
the COVID-19 tragedy unfolded in the USA with 
27 million total cases, the highest number in 
the world. Its total deaths of over 454,000 
(Worldometers, 2021) have exceeded that country‘s 
total deaths during the Second World War1. 
America‘s daily death rate has peaked at 3,253 
exceeding the terrorist toll of 2,996 from 9–11 and 
expected to continue at that rate over in early 2021, 
notwithstanding the commencement of its vaccine 
distribution (Heavey, 2020). A series of early 
mistakes in a rapidly evolving situation, political 
struggles at many levels, rejection of expert advice, 
and lack of national leadership, and denialism were 
all contributing factors (Wright, 2021).  
Across the Atlantic, in the UK, total cases were 
just short of 4 million and the official COVID-19 
death toll in Britain is over 112,000 (Worldometers, 
2021). It remains to be seen whether its toll will rise 
                                                          
1 Total American military and civilian deaths were 418,5000 deaths.  
See the US National World War Two Museum at 
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/
research-starters/research-starters-worldwide-deaths-world-war  
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to match its 125,000 losses in the Battle of 
the Somme during the First World War. A Briton is 
nearly 40 times more likely than the average 
Australian to die of COVID-19.  
In terms of the response by the latter two 
Anglo-American countries, the question that can be 
asked is: “Why did so many have to die?” (Ball, Clark, 
& Hinsliff, 2021). 
Australia‘s response, tentative at the start of 
January 2020, saw a states-based approach and 
attack that demonstrated the strength of its federal 
system in the absence of Commonwealth leadership. 
In the state of Victoria, which saw its second wave 
result in a disproportionate amount of deaths in 
Commonwealth-funded aged care, its lockdown was 
severe and enduring: ―Australia has exited its first 
recession in almost three decades, with the economy 
growing by a better than expected 3.3% in 
the September quarter, reflecting authorities‘ adept 
handling of the COVID-19 pandemic‖ (Smyth, 2020).  
As the fog lifts from the pandemic, it is 
becoming clear that the socioeconomic pain of 
lockdown reaped a pandemic economic equilibrium 
by the end of 2020. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 presents a crisis management 
framework. Section 3 provides an overview of 
the Australian context. Section 4 provides 
the Australian health response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Section 5 summarises the Australian 
government‘s economic response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Section 6 discusses the governance 
capacity of the Australian government‘s response. 
Section 7 reviews the governance legitimacy and 
trust deficit in the Australian political culture and its 
elites. Section 8 discusses the impact the COVID-19 
pandemic has on sustainability in Australia. Finally, 
the conclusion section (Section 9) summarises our 
main arguments. 
 
2. CRISIS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
This paper considers Australia‘s successful 
COVID-19 response during 2020 from the point of 
view of public governance capacity, legitimacy, and 
sustainability. It examines the relationship between 
governance capacity to deliver and governance 
legitimacy for public acceptance as a joint process of 
co-production. The governance dimensions of this 
relationship of ―mutual trust‖ are discussed in terms 
of leadership, social cohesion, transparency, expert 
advice, communication, and outcomes. Successful 
―crisis management‖ and sustainability in 
a pluralistic democracy are seen to rely upon these 
dimensions of governance.  
―Crisis management is most successful when it 
is able to combine government capacity with 
democratic legitimacy‖ (Christensen & Laegreid, 
2020). Adopting this framework this paper explores 
the Australian experience in successful COVID 
management as the joint product or co-production 
of the relationship between government and 
the community (Brandsen & Honingh, 2016). 
Administrative competence alone cannot deliver 
results without the acceptance and compliance of 
the community; a relationship built upon mutual 
respect and trust. 
There is a complex tradeoff between these two 
dimensions of effective crisis management; 
the relationship is also dynamic and can change over 
the course of the crisis. The pandemic challenges 
institutions and values, while major decisions need 
to be taken under deep uncertainty and public 
measures have an experimental quality of trial 
and error as new data and knowledge unfolds at  
a rapid pace. 
 
3. AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT 
 
The Commonwealth of Australia has a multicultural, 
immigrant population of 26 million people and is 
a rich, stable, liberal democratic nation. It has 
a Westminister-style representative government, 
a federal constitution, an egalitarian culture of 
opportunity tempered with individuality. It is among 
the most highly urbanised countries but also 
sparsely occupies a dry continent the size of 
the contiguous states of the USA. Australia was 
established as a British colony in 1788 dispossessing 
the continent‘s first nations indigenous aboriginal 
peoples and their continuous culture of over 
60,000 years.  
The Coalition Liberal National Country Party 
Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, sees himself as 
an ―ordinary bloke‖, loves his ―footie‖, identifies 
with ―tradies‖ and adroitly manages his image as 
―Scotty from marketing‖ befitting his previous 
background as a marketing executive. His critics 
portray him as strong on announcements and poor 
on delivery (Feik, 2020). While there are elements of 
the ‗populist‘ politician in his political appeal and 
rhetoric, his economic policies have tended to 
maintain a broadly moderate neoliberal, 
market-facing, small government stance with 
broadly conservative social values.  
The government is under the sway of climate 
deniers and vested commercial and fossil fuel 
interests that continue among other things, to 
politicise and paralyse any commitments to 
an effective and timely commitment to transition 
to a carbon-free economy (Hodder, 2009). Morrison 
iconically walked into Parliament carrying a lump of 
black coal touting fossil fuels but he has kept 
Australia within the Paris Climate Accords. His 
government has managed to weather a rolling series 
of ―scandals‖ and despite strong public support, has 
stonewalled attempts to legislate a federal 
anti-corruption body (Bennett, 2020; Feik, 2021). 
To date, Australia has avoided the worst of 
the ―populist‖ and ―nationalist‖ reactions to 
neoliberalism that have characterised the rise of 
Trump and Johnson (Lester & dela Rama, 2018). 
Under Morrison, Australia‘s successful response to 
the COVID-19 crisis has displayed political and 
economic resilience and adaptability displaying 
a pragmatism not found in America and the UK as 
they continue to be overwhelmed health-wise and 
economically by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
As a result of broad structural reforms during 
the 1980s and 1990s, the Australian economy has 
enjoyed three decades of continuous economic 
growth. In the decade prior to COVID-19 economic 
reform had lost any real momentum and structural 
problems continued to amass unaddressed  
(Pascoe, 2020).  
Unemployment was increasing, wages growth 
was flat, inequality was increasing, productivity 
improvement was anaemic, infrastructure 
investment was lagging, the education and skills 
training sectors were underperforming, housing 
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affordability declined, social housing was grossly 
undersupplied, poverty was on the rise, and certain 
sectors such as aged care, energy, and climate 
change policies have been long-disputed and 
politicised resulting in long-standing disarray  
(Irvine, 2019). Monetary policy was exhausted with 
interest rates that had been driven to all-time lows. 
There was pressure pre-COVID-19 on a reluctant 
government committed to surplus budgets and 
reduced debt for fiscal policies necessary to 
stimulate the economy. Structural reforms were  
long overdue. There was a little political appetite  
for reform. 
 
4. AUSTRALIA’S HEALTH RESPONSE 
 
The first case of COVID-19 in Australia arrived with 
a passenger from Wuhan on 25th January 2020 
(Hunt, 2020) signalling the start of the pandemic 
crisis in the country. The pandemic immediately 
came hot on the heels of a prolonged drought  
(Day, 2019) and unprecedented bushfires (Australian 
Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster 
Arrangements, 2020) that created national crises 
and emergency management responses that were 
generally found wanting in terms of both 
preparedness and coordination of services delivery. 
Morrison struggled to realize a leadership role 
in a federal system where emergency response 
services capabilities lie with state governments. 
He was perceived as aloof from the 2019 bushfire 
national emergency whilst on holiday in Hawaii 
(Reimekis, 2019). 
In response to COVID, Morrison exercised 
personal leadership, stepped before the media and 
the public accompanied by his Health Minister, 
fronted by the government‘s Chief Medical Adviser. 
The action was evidence and expert-based and 
communicated daily, in detail, and extensively. 
In daily public and media briefings, chief medical 
officers explained and described the details of 
the measures being taken and the science behind 
them (Manning, 2020). Dr. Brendan Murphy, Chief 
Medical Officer, convened the Australian Health 
Protection Principle Committee (AHPCC) to inform 
State and Territory Authorities and to coordinate 
further action nationally.  
Working closely with State Governments, 
the PM for the first time constituted in mid-March 
a novel, collaborative National Cabinet of federal and 
state governments to tackle the crisis in a nationally 
co-ordinated, inter-governmental decision-making 
forum (Burton, 2020). Under Australia‘s federated 
system of government, the six sovereign State 
governments (along with two federal territories) are 
constitutionally responsible for a range of public 
services, including disaster management, transport, 
police, education, environment, and particularly for 
health and the management of the public health and 
hospital delivery system. This represented a political 
choice for co-operation over confrontation.  
A range of strong measures was put in place 
variously during the year, including, effective 
restrictions and closures of public gatherings, 
business activities, schools and universities, social 
distancing, city-wide lockdowns, international and 
state border closures and travel restrictions, 
quarantine measures, personal hygiene and ―stay 
safe‖ protocols, contact testing, tracing and tracking 
systems. The health-based restrictions were 
designed to ―flatten the first wave‖ and subsequent 
waves of infection spread by limiting transmission: 
the aim of this suppression was to avoid 
overwhelming the capacity of the public health and 
hospital systems. Elimination strategies were 
variously adopted in cities, regions, and states. They 
were broadly successful. 
In taking this range of highly restrictive 
health-based measures the federal and state 
governments invoked the authority under their 
legislated emergency powers, primarily in the hands 
of state governments (McLean & Huf, 2020). 
The effective exercise and acceptance of these 
powers involve striking a delicate balance with 
prevailing norms of the democratic process. Clear, 
consistent, and transparent communication based 
on credible, expert scientific advice was 
an important part of delivering public acceptance of 
the measures and ‗flattening the curve‘ of daily cases. 
The health and expert-driven responses 
flattened the first wave of infection spread and 
albeit a few bumps along the way including, cruise 
ship and hotel quarantine mismanagement, 
considered and targeted opening up measures were 
progressively implemented. In the early stages in 
March the country was on track with the USA and 
the UK who subsequently, however, hit disastrous 
numbers of cases and deaths, not abated even by the 
end of the year. Only one month later Australia had 
flattened the curve to below world best earlier and 
sharp responses in New Zealand, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Japan, and China.  
Perhaps a note of complacency crept in to be 
brought sharply to check as the unexpected and 
significant ―second wave‖ hit during the Australian 
winter in the state of Victoria in July occasioning 
the most severe and prolonged lockdown (Mercer, 
2020). A ―state of emergency‖ was declared for 
a lockdown that lasted 112 days with 690 deaths 
(Tsirtsakis, 2019) largely occurring in privately-
owned aged care. Nearly 75% of Australia‘s COVID 
deaths have occurred in residential aged care — 
the highest proportion by sector in the OECD 
(Australian Royal Commission into Aged Care 
Quality and Safety, 2020). 
The Queensland Government subsequently 
locked down Brisbane for a shorter but equally 
effective period (Bennett, 2021). Political tensions 
increasingly emerged, including over the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency of state testing and 
tracing capacity, whether elimination or suppression 
was the appropriate success criterion, and 
the opening up of interstate and indeed overseas 
border restrictions.  
With the successful suppression of the second 
wave in Victoria by November, and of the smaller 
second wave and lockdown in South Australia in 
November (Davey, 2020) the economy resumed 
opening up. The remaining politically controversial 
significant border closing by Queensland to New 
South Wales (NSW) was lifted in February 2021 
(Lynch & Ward, 2021).  
By the end of the year, cases and deaths were 
virtually eliminated, the economy was opening up 
and growth for the September quarter began 
recovering from the COVID-19 recession. 
The country moved towards full suppression by 
2020 with a cautious semblance of normality for 
the holiday season and the New Year. 
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5. ECONOMIC RESPONSES 
 
The impacts of the health-based measures in 
Australia on government, society, business, and 
the economy were also immediate, and with 
inevitably long-term consequences. They were also 
severe, not least the closedown of businesses, loss of 
jobs across the economy, and a huge fall in 
economic growth leading to the first recession since 
the early 1990s.  
Within the first month of lockdown one million 
jobs were lost and subsequently rose to 1.6 million. 
These losses fell heavily on service sectors such as 
retail, hospitality, tourism, culture, and education. 
These hard-hit sectors were generally characterised 
by less secure, lower-paying jobs, and dominated by 
women and young people (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2020a). Notwithstanding, the recovery 
from recession in the 2020 September quarter there 
were still a million unemployed largely disguised by 
continuing government wage subsidies. 
Economic policies and programs were put in 
place to take up the slack in the economy driven by 
health measures, the deepest recession since 
The Great Depression of the 1930s. In particular, 
the government introduced unprecedented wage 
subsidy and unemployment benefits measures 
(known as JobKeeper), despite having previously 
been ideologically consistently opposed to lifting 
unemployment benefit levels, and to providing 
government wage subsidies to employers. Similar to 
other OECD countries (OECD, 2020a), measures were 
taken to approve virtual annual general meetings 
and ensure transparency through amending 
continuous disclosure provisions (Australian Budget, 
2020) with varying degrees of success. 
Taxes were cut and incentives were provided 
for businesses, particularly for housing and 
construction sectors ―HomeBuilder‖, and consumers 
lifting consumer savings levels to all-time highs 
(Frydenberg, 2020) and lifting half a million people 
out of poverty (Davidson, Bradbury, Wong, & Hill, 
2020). The compulsory superannuation savings pool 
of over $1 trillion was opened up for early cash 
access withdrawals by wage earners with nearly 
$3.5 million taking advantage (McKeown, 2020). 
Nevertheless, as eventuated globally by the end 
of 2020 the levels of inequality within countries 
were exacerbated, including in Australia. The richest 
recovered quickly with unprecedented support from 
governments leaving a long slow haul to recovery for 
the less secure and wealthy (Khadem, 2021). 
The net effect of the government economic 
interventions was to dramatically increase 
government expenditures while the tax revenue base 
was substantially reduced. Wage support and 
welfare expenditures soared by nearly $60 billion 
while personal and company tax receipts collapsed 
by over $20 billion. Effectively, the government 
deficit for 2019–2020 exploded to AUD$86 billion 
as did the country‘s level of indebtedness 
(Worthington, 2020) at 11% of GDP. This was 
the highest since the end of the Second World War 
and exceeded the post-global financial crisis deficit. 
The promises made prior to the election were 
undone as any Morrison government surplus 
disappeared with the onset of the pandemic.  
Federal and state budgets dropped significantly 
into deficit as a result of the pandemic. All states 
had deficits proportionate to their economies, 
except WA which avoided one due primarily to 
surging iron ore prices (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2020b).  
As a result, all are carrying debt levels not seen 
since the Second World War. Victoria, the worst-hit 
state, had net debt doubled to $87 billion. NSW is 
expected to carry net debt of $104 billion within 
4 years. Commonwealth net debt is expected to 
dwarf the states to reach a record $700 billion by 
30th June 2021 and keep climbing. Total net debt 
across all governments is forecast to be $1.4 trillion 
in 2023–2024.  
The climb out of deficit is likely to be 
protracted with expectations that the economy will 
not get back to pre-pandemic levels until at least 
2022. Extended low growth will mean relatively high 
unemployment. In real terms, inflation that is low, as 
are interest rates, will likely outstrip already low 
rates of wage growth. Australia is in the early state 
of COVID-19 recovery. 
 
6. GOVERNANCE CAPACITY 
 
We discuss Australia‘s successful response during 
2020 to the pandemic crisis along the following 
dimensions of governance capacity: preparedness or 
analytical capacity; coordination; regulation; and 
implementation or delivery capacity to provide 




The analytical dimension of crisis and transition 
management capacity is realized in the first instance 
to the state of preparedness to respond and 
a capacity to deliver required outcomes. Across 
a range of policy areas in Australia, there had been 
many warnings in inquiries, reports, reviews, and 
royal commissions, largely ignored over the years in 
Australia about the growing potential for crises and 
the need to reset policies and institutions. These 
ranged from the need for fundamental economic 
restructuring to federalism, national security, and to 
a range of emerging social crises around poverty, 
inequality, housing, aged care, indigenous rights, 
and importantly in regard to climate change, 
drought, and bushfires, and not least global 
pandemics (Boyle, 2021). The general approach had 
been belated, grudging, and piecemeal rather than 
systematic and holistic reform; at best a ‗she will be 
right‘ pragmatism and complacency.  
In the year before the pandemic, the global 
collective overall health security of 195 countries 
including to respond to epidemics and pandemics 
was assessed as ―remaining very weak‖ at an average 
of 40/100 (Global Health Security Index, 2019). 
While Australia has an enviable public health system 
and ranked No. 3 (76/100) on its overall health 
security (behind the USA 84/100 and the UK 78/100) 
its specific preparedness for pandemic response 
ranking was No. 10 (66/100) against the USA No. 2 
(79/100, the UK No. 1 92/100). Perhaps the latter is 
somewhat ironically given those two countries‘ 
significantly less effective response to COVID-19.  
Internationally, over the past quarter-century, 
there were many and widespread expert warnings of 
potential global pandemics and the need for 
preparedness that had been ignored by successive 
governments and leaders (Graff, 2020). Lessons from 
the SARS outbreak from 2003–2004 (Heymann, 
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2004) did not produce a globally consistent, united, 
dynamic response required in 2020. 
The attitude and response to the coming of 
COVID-19 from many leaders, in particular in 
the USA, was that this was an unexpected,  
out-of-left-field, unimaginable event, that came up 
suddenly and surprisingly. This was no ―black swan‖ 
event but rather a ―pink flamingo‖, glaringly obvious 
but widely ignored, knowable and known.  
In the case of the various pandemic 
preparedness plans in Australia effectiveness was 
assessed pre-COVID in the range of 20%–75% with 
many inconsistencies between plans. Health system 
related issues were better addressed than critical 
infrastructure and essential systems resilience. 
According to Ifzwerth, Moa, and MacIntyre (2018) 
―Pandemic response would be more effective if plans 
were standardized, clear, and were to include 
overlooked dimensions of pandemic‘s impact as well 
as guidance for specific end users‖.  
Australia escaped the worst of recent global 
zoonotic pandemics such as SARS, mad cow disease, 
and HN1 and appears not to have gained benefit 
from the experiences of its regional Asia Pacific 
neighbours, many of which, to their advantage, 
learned from the warnings and experience that 
informed their largely successful responses (Abuza, 
2020). Despite earlier warnings about pandemics 
and the need to develop contingency plans and 
resources little had been put in place in Australia. 
Stockpiles of emergency medicines, infection control 
equipment, including PPE and ventilators, were 
quickly shown to be insufficient, and local suppliers 
and global supply chains were found wanting 
(Pournader, 2020).  
Perhaps a measure of ―pandemic fatigue‖ and 
complacency had crept in after these earlier 
pandemics had passed by relatively lightly in 
Australia. It had been a world leader in pandemic 
preparation in the 2000s and the work culminated in 
two large national training exercises in 2006 and 
the last in 2008 (Welch & Blucher, 2020). 
On the other hand, Australia has a world-class 
public health system underpinned by internationally 
acknowledged medical research (Dixit & Sambasivan, 
2018). The overall system is decentralized in 
the sense that while the Commonwealth Government 
funds a majority of health systems, responsibility 
and delivery lies with the states. There had been 
funding cutbacks and privatization over recent 
decades (Kerr & Hendrie, 2018). The importance of 
this capacity and its sensitivity was demonstrated in 
the respective differences in the initial test, track, 
and traceability between NSW and Victoria. 
The latter had cut back expenditure on public health 
in recent years and had a relatively centralised 
system, fared less well initially than did the former. 
The weakest link in the health system was in 
the aged care sector. A Commonwealth rather than 
State government responsibility it had been largely 
privatised and, and was revealed to lack real 
pandemic operational plans despite the boast by 
a toothless aged care regulator that 99% of providers 
were prepared in March 2020: ―It is very encouraging 
that 99% of services reported having an infection 
control outbreak management plan that covers the 
key areas for COVID-19 preparedness‖2.  
                                                          
2 See Aged Care Quality Bulletin No. 15, March 2020 at 
https://www.agedcarequality.gov.au/news/newsletter/aged-care-quality-
bulletin-15-march-2020 
The pandemic was the perfect storm that 
magnified the dysfunctional regulation of a sector 
that had woefully inadequate skilled staff, training, 
and equipment.  
The health response by the Federal Government 
was the subject of the interim report of 
the Australian Senate COVID commission interim 
report. The Committee expressed its disappointment 
that: 
―[…] rather than accept its mistakes in leading 
the health response and keeping aged care residents 
safe, the government has repeatedly sought to avoid 
taking responsibility and shift blame onto the states. 
The Prime Minister also created confusion and 
splintered federal cooperation by criticising state 
and territory decisions to close schools and impose 
domestic border restrictions‖ (Australian Senate 
Select Committee, 2020). 
The country‘s economic preparedness was 
fiscally sound having experienced nearly thirty years 
of sustained economic growth. Budget deficits were 
minimal and falling while debt was low by world 
standards. Notwithstanding many years of coalition 
government fiscal restraint and political rhetoric of 
the need for budget surpluses and lower debt levels, 
they were able to respond with a swath of strong 
economic measures to support businesses, people, 
and the economy.  
 
6.2. Coordination capacity: Decision-making and 
collaboration 
 
A relatively collaborative and consensual style was 
adopted by the federal government in working with 
the state governments, often of different political 
parties, under the aegis of a specially established 
National Cabinet. This met regularly and agreed with 
broad policy approaches that were in stark contrast 
to decades of bickering and haggling primarily over 
money in long-standing commonwealth state 
ministerial forum arrangements headed by 
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) that 
were widely acknowledged as in need of reform.  
These developments represented heightened 
levels of government trust of expertise and between 
levels of government. They demonstrated political 
and ideological pragmatism and walking away from 
pre-COVID confrontational, partisan politics 
especially between the federal and state government 
on the one hand, and between the political parties 
on the other. At the national level, the Opposition 
party, minor parties, and independents largely went 
along with the strategies adopted restricting 
criticisms to shortcomings in delivery and 
advocating for the more vulnerable caught up in 
the crisis. Industry and business associations 
supported the strategies and policies and were 
generally compliant with regulations and restrictions 
imposed.  
Important as the nationally coordinated 
strategy frameworks were particularly from 
an economic and fiscal perspective, it was state 
governments and their policies and activities that 
mattered most on the ground. Local governments 
that operate under state government authority 
complied without exception to their respective state 
government policies in respect of their local 
community regulatory and community service 
delivery responsibilities and made required 
adaptations to suit local conditions. 
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These collaborative and decentralized 
arrangements allowed for the strategies to change 
and adapt as the crisis unfolded and in response to 
local conditions. Strategies involved a changing mix 
of flattening the curve, mitigation, through to test, 
track and trace, lockdown suppression to hotspot 
declarations, interstate border closures to 
the overall easing of restrictions, and opening up 
late in the year.  
Overall, the government decision-making and 
implementation were first and foremost driven by 
the acceptance of expert scientific health advice in 
a timely and effective manner. Success was all 
the more impressive given the lack of pre-COVID 
preparedness, planning, and operational exercises, 
and the acceptance of such advice in the prevailing 
conditions of deep uncertainty (Ansell & Boin, 2019). 
The evidence-based knowledge emerged 
progressively and rapidly as the crisis unfolded 
during 2020 in response to learning from measures 
taken and subsequent relaxations. Effectiveness was 
the result of coordination and collaboration between 
the levels of government and state government‘s 
strong health services delivery capacity. 
 
6.3 Delivery and regulatory capacity 
 
The overall approach was led and coordinated 
nationally from the top down but the state and 
territory governments exercised considerable 
authority and discretion for regulation and delivery 
under their sovereign responsibilities and capacities, 
particularly with respect to health, education, 
transport, business regulation, and law enforcement. 
Two significant areas of structural weakness 
were revealed in delivery and regulatory capacity 
and accountability that were papered over in 
the crisis but will require attention in the future. 
Aged care and quarantine arrangements are both 
constitutionally federal government responsibilities 
where quality control and capacity were stressed 
and where the federal government managed largely 
to avoid its responsibilities and accountability in 
part by shifting them to the states. 
Overall, the strategy was implemented using 
a blend of advice, guidelines, and mandatory 
regulations. The mix varied over time and between 
the federal and state jurisdictions. Public compliance 
was underpinned by mutual trust between the public 
and the government. There was only limited 
pushback or shying away from the tough decisions 
and measures that shut down businesses, closed 
international and interstate borders, travel 
restrictions, imposed citywide and local area 
lockdowns, including curfews, social distancing, 
building isolations, and suspension of all sporting, 
arts and entertainment venues.  
In summary, governance capacity was 
pragmatically and successfully demonstrated within 
a federal system in respect of delivery, regulation, 
and coordination notwithstanding shortcomings on 
pandemic management preparedness and lack of 
clarity of respective responsibilities under 
the constitution. The successful largely reactive and 
agile response of governance arrangements to 
the crisis serves to highlight the lack of sure-
footedness in anticipating problems but leaves open 
the question of whether things might have been 
even better handled with a governance culture of 
preparedness and pro-activity (Barber, 2020).  
7. GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 
 
We discuss Australia‘s successful COVID-19 crisis 
management experience during 2020 from the point 
of view of governance legitimacy (Christensen, 
Laegreid, & Rykkja, 2016) which turns on issues such 
as transparency, accountability, support, 
expectations, and reputation that are required to 
maintain citizens‘ trust in government in handling 
the crisis. 
 
7.1. Making sense of crisis: Appealing to solidarity 
 
Appealing to a sense of social cohesion and personal 
sacrifice for the public health good was a constant 
government communications motif captured in 
the idea of ―we are all in this together‖ coupled with 
the utilitarian response.  
Given the need to make decisions amid a ―fog 
of uncertainty‖ in knowledge and the need to modify 
measures as the pandemic unfolded and new data 
came to hand daily, it was important for credibility 
that government public briefings were frequent and 
detailed. The communications framework as well as 
being presented within the broader strategic 
framework agreed at regular working meetings of 
the National Cabinet was given added credibility and 
transparency by the presentations of the health 
and epidemiological experts.  
There was an enhanced level of both vertical 
hierarchical and horizontal transparency and 
accountability (Schillemans, 2018). Central to 
the responses were the health-based measures and 
restrictions that were presented by the politicians in 
an objective and measured public health terms. 
The term ―an abundance of caution‖ was often used 
in the justification of precautionary measures. It was 
neither politicized nor dramatized beyond stressing 
the serious unprecedented nature of this pandemic 
threat to public safety and to the capacity of 
the public health system to continue to provide 
a high standard of health care, including the 
availability of hospital and intensive care unit (ICU) 
capacity, personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
other necessary medical supplies.  
Mistakes in the pandemic response were often 
hindsight errors of judgement, while others 
reflected a basic difference in the weighting of 
public safety against economic costs, and 
undoubtedly included an element of political 
judgement and even ideology of weighing health as 
against economic objectives. Some revealed 
structural and systemic weaknesses that can only be 
tackled if at all, in the long term. It is fair to observe 
though, that despite these bumps along the road of 
crisis management and largely learning by 
experiment in the face of uncertainty, the thrust of 
often severe, health evidence-based responses was 
successfully maintained and accepted by 
governments and the public. 
The few, isolated cases of civil disobedience, 
such as ―Bunnings Karen‖ (Nally & staff, 2020) were 
widely publicized in the media and presented as 
anti-social aberrations. Conspiracy theories and 
disinformation did not proliferate as much as in 
other countries (Spring & Wendling, 2020). Fines 
were promptly issued by the police to individuals 
and businesses in breach of regulations typically of 
social distancing rules and border restrictions. A few 
large parties at homes, restaurants, or on 
the beaches were broken up by the authorities and 
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publicized in the media. Public protests and 
demonstrations were few and typically small in 
numbers, including a Black Lives Matters protest 
that went ahead despite lack of formal approval but 
in compliance with social distancing, hygiene,  
and masks wearing. A lone, high-profile 
businessman-cum-politician, Clive Palmer, challenged 
the Western Australian state government lockdown 
power unsuccessfully in the courts (High Court of 
Australia, 2020). 
During the COVID crisis, governance capacity 
was effectively harnessed to governance legitimacy. 
Government action and services were seen to be 
competent, able to deliver, to matter, and to make 
a difference. Public trust even extended for example, 
to large-scale acceptance and use of the COVID 
tracing app developed at considerable cost but 
proven flawed from the outset and ineffective in 
the long term. 
 
7.2. Trust in government 
 
Pre-COVID, Australians‘ trust in politics, politicians, 
and the government had been on a long-term 
declining trend but lifted as the result of 
the successful pandemic management during 2020. 
The Prime Minister‘s personal popularity ratings 
soared. The role of an opponent during a pandemic 
emergency is a ‗no-win‘ situation politically. Generally, 
the profile and approval ratings for the state and 
territory premiers and governments also rose, 
irrespective of the party in power. The usually pretty 
intense ideological and party political differences 
were seen to be set aside during the crisis 
management and for the most part, they were.  
However, as the year unfolded political 
tensions also rose between federal and state, and 
between state governments on issues particularly on 
issues such as rates of loosening restrictions, border 
closures, and caps on international arrival numbers. 
Leadership was seen to be important in the eyes of 
the public and its acceptance of often very difficult 
public health-driven restrictions.  
Confidence and trust among citizens were 
generally high and steady. However, confidence in 
the economy inevitably sagged with increasing 
restrictions, lockdowns, unemployment, and as 
the economy fell into recession. It recovered 
unexpectedly fast late in the year as measured by 
consumer confidence and spending due to effective 
pandemic control, rising employment, and savings in 
hand bolstered by government income support 
arrangements. Business confidence was more 
ambivalent, not least given continuing uncertainties 
about on-again, off-again local outbreaks and 
lockdowns, and despite considerable government tax 
and investment incentives to business. Businesses 
are clearly wary of making investments on 
the supply side if consumers do not feel COVID-safe 
and exhibit demand.  
How sustainable this increase in trust of 
government proves to be is an open question. Other 
underlying measures of trust, particularly in regard 
to issues of political corruption, lobbying, political 
donations, and the vested interests of big business 
remained on their pre-COVID falling trend lines. 
The generally cooperative approach of governments, 
agencies, and leaders was a vote of confidence in 
the Australian democratic tradition and in the ability 
of government to deliver important services. This 
was notwithstanding the enhanced role of leaders 
and experts noted in our discussion, unlike places 
like the USA and the UK where populism and 
authoritarianism failed disastrously to deliver even 
competent COVID crisis management. Authoritarian 
countries overall had no prolonged advantage in 
suppressing the virus and their initial successes 
converged over time with the generally laggard 
performance of democracies (Lang & Lemahieu, 2021). 
But post-COVID there is an underlying and 
continuing deficit of distrust in the fundamentals of 
democratic transparency and accountability that will 
need to be addressed. Across the world, people are 
widely dissatisfied with democracy but more divided 
on whether the state is run for the benefit of all. 
Those who believe elected officials do not care about 
ordinary people are more dissatisfied with 
democracy: the gap in Australia between those who 
believe that public officials care (20%) and those 
who believe that they do not care (54%), is 
the second largest in the world (34%) (Connaughton, 
Kent, & Schumacher, 2020). 
In summary, governance legitimacy in crisis 
management not only requires effective 
decision-making and implementation but must also 
be supported by sense-making and communication 
to tap into and enhance an environment of mutual 
trust between all stakeholders in government and 
the community. The pragmatic evidence-based 
and agile approach is taken in prevailing conditions 
of deep uncertainty, experimentation and learning 
by doing required nothing less for its success. 
In Australia, during the COVID-19 pandemic  
crisis in 2020, leaders and governments elevated 
the meaning-making process and its communication 
to new heights of practice in transparency and 
frequency.  
Ideologies and politicization were set aside in 
the co-production between government and 
community stakeholders of a narrative of ―public 
health and safety‖ in a spirit of social cohesion. 
The government succeeded by effectively connecting 
governance capacity and delivery with legitimacy 
and public acceptance in a co-production process 
(Moon, 2020). People accepted personal restrictions 
at personal costs in the interests of public health 
and safety. New levels of mutual trust were 
generated to deliver successful COVID crisis 
management. 
 
8. IMPACT ON SUSTAINABILITY 
 
COVID presented opportunities and challenges in 
Australia to embrace sustainability. The crisis 
provided a unique opportunity to analyse in real 
time the effects of a protracted ―major landscape 
shock‖ on the trajectories of sustainability transitions 
(Kanda & Kivimaa, 2020). For governments, 
businesses and citizens the crisis has brought about 
the lived experience of immediate and major 
―disruptive‖ change (Foulis, 2020). Fundamental 
shifts from one kind of socio-economic and 
technical setting to another can occur over three 
interactive and dynamic levels: 1) niches for 
emerging radical innovations; 2) regimes of existing 
institutional structures characterised by lock-in; and 
3) exogenous pressures influencing both other levels 
(Geels, 2002).  
Sustainability transitions frequently occur and 
mature over decades but as Kanda and Kivimaa 
(2020) point out ―the COVID-19 outbreak offers 
the possibility to question such assumptions by 
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showing vividly that some systemic and deeply 
structural changes in socio-economic systems can 
under certain circumstances occur quite rapidly‖. 
For the Morrison government, his party‘s reluctant 
embrace of Paris climate change targets may see 
change thrust upon their policy formulation rather 
than persist with the denialism that has dominated 
the policy agenda for the past decade. Any such 
shift is also likely to be heavily influenced by 
exogenous, international developments, pressures, 
from the new American Presidential administration, 
UK Prime Minister Johnson, and net-zero emission 
commitments of Australia‘s neighbouring, Asian 
trading partners.  
Responses to the pandemic are likely to 
accelerate structural shifts facilitated by new 
technology and to encourage improvements in 
governance systems, including through better crisis 
preparedness, and enhanced public trust not only in 
carbon-heavy Australia but elsewhere. These 
developments would augur well not only for 
the more effective handling of further global 
pandemics but also for the climate and energy crises 
and transitions facing the world. Rising to 
the challenge of these new opportunities will require 
a willingness to move in the recovery beyond 
―business as usual‖ to a ―new normal‖ (Kivimaa & 
Kern, 2016). It will also require a commitment to 
long-term goals and planning so far resisted by 
Australia. The OECD has called for governments to 
learn from the COVID experience by ―building back 
better‖ for handling resilience to future shocks, 
enhancing wellbeing and inclusiveness, and 
transitioning to sustainability (OECD, 2020b). 
The COVID-19 crisis has devastated many 
sectors but it has also ‗turbo-charged the internet‘ 
foreshadowing big structural changes in the economy. 
The behaviour of workers, consumers, and 
businesses changed during the pandemic, not least 
in response to health-based restrictions and taking 
advantage of digital technologies. The case of 
GameStop in early 2021 symbolised the digital fight 
between largely small investors against hedge fund 
companies and demonstrated that casino capitalism 
during a pandemic is not as easily tolerated 
(Schroeder & Prentice, 2021) Changes in social 
behaviour are likely to endure into and beyond any 




The global experience with responses to COVID-19 
during 2020 has shown how tendentious and 
politicized has been the debate in many countries, 
particularly in the USA, where it has been rooted in 
an implied trade-off between health and economic 
costs, and between individual freedom and social 
responsibility. 
This paper has examined Australia‘s successful 
COVID-19 transformational crisis management as 
a ―joint-production‖ of government capacity and its 
legitimacy and public acceptability and considers 
the lessons for post-pandemic governance 
sustainability in the face of future existential crises, 
including global climate change. Australia ranked 
among the best-performing countries in minimizing 
impacts on public health especially cases and death 
rates while at the same time minimizing economic 
impacts and underpinning a quick recovery.  
The government was able to act decisively and 
effectively in responding to the pandemic during 
2020 and the population accepted unprecedented 
restrictions and a degree of coerciveness on its 
personal and social freedoms. In a spirit of social 
solidarity and mutual responsibility, there was 
an only minor and isolated protest or dissent. 
This high level of public compliance and conformity 
was all the more remarkable an achievement given 
the political trust deficit that had been declining for 
many years and had reached unprecedented low 
levels of 20% trust in government immediately 
before COVID arrived. By the end of the year there 
was a strong and significant reversion in trust of 
institutions, politicians, and even the media however 
if the government does not communicate in 
a transparent and authentic way, then public 
support will not be sustainable. 
Government capacity for crisis management 
was deployed in an efficient and effective manner in 
a way that earned and built public trust. 
Notwithstanding an arguable lack of preparedness, 
the administration of public services from health 
through economic measures demonstrated that 
the public sector and government have a role and 
can deliver when properly resourced.  
Government capacity was also enhanced by 
pragmatic political leadership and cooperation that 
set aside previous political bickering and 
institutional tensions and conveyed a unified picture 
of leaders pulling together to act in the broader 
national and public interest. There was broad 
agreement on the common values that mattered, 
namely, public health and safety, support for ―front 
line workers‖, and fiscal relief for those who lost 
business and employment. Ideology, politics, and 
confrontation were largely set aside. 
The creation of a National Cabinet of Prime 
Minister and State Premiers was an important 
innovation communicating unity of purpose and 
coordination of capacity, much of which rested with 
the States and Territories. Inevitable day-to-day 
disagreements between the parties were more 
readily accepted by the public in this context. This 
governance style had not been on display during 
the immediately preceding national bushfires 
emergency at the expense of public trust.  
Adding to this trust in governance 
arrangements was the acceptance of medical expert 
advice, the transparency, and effective public 
communication of that advice. This was particularly 
important in explaining and gaining acceptance for 
frequently changing measures on ―learning by doing 
basis‖ and in the face of a ―fog of uncertainty‖ in 
scientific knowledge about the coronavirus itself.  
In the ―fog of uncertainty‖ surrounding 
the coronavirus and its fast-evolving behaviour, 
experimentation, and learning, there were inevitable 
mistakes, mismanagement, overreaction, lack of 
coordination, and poor communication along 
the way. Striking a day-to-day perfect balance 
between individual freedoms and public safety was 
never going to be easy. What was important to 
the success and legitimacy of governance was 
an effective practical deployment of governance 
capacity. Transparency and accountability were 
strengthened by daily briefings and prompt reviews 
of mistakes. There was public recognition and 
acceptance that in a time of crisis unified and 
coherent action by government and the state it is 
better to err on the side of precaution and risk 
aversion than not.  
The question remains whether these lessons 
learned in the successful crisis management of 
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COVID-19 during 2020 will be taken forward in 
a sustainable governance model to tackle systemic, 
transformational challenges, including inequality, 
social justice, and global climate change. The early 
analysis and signs are not completely encouraging. 
Most of the measures taken both as health-based 
restrictions and as economic responses do break 
with prevailing government policies and ideologies, 
and with conventional governance practice. 
However, for the most part, the health-based 
restrictions invoked existing emergency powers 
legislation with clear sunset provisions. 
The economic measures of financial support that 
alleviated social injustice and inequality in poverty 
and housing are also of clearly specified and limited 
duration effect and will be phased out. 
Overall, there is little evidence of any real, 
potentially long-lasting innovative, structural 
changes at the political level. The possible exception 
is the establishment of the National Cabinet that 
now replaces the defunct and ineffective Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) as the primary 
forum for inter-governmental decision-making. 
The budgetary, economic recovery measures 
announced in October for the most part mark 
a reversion to pre-COVID-19 ―business as usual‖ 
government policies with little evidence of grasping 
the opportunities of learning and reform to ―build 
better‖ for a sustainable future. The crisis 
management lessons of preparedness, expert advice, 
cooperation, transparency, accountability, 
government service delivery capacity, common 
purpose, clear communication, and planning show 
little sign of impressing themselves on the Morrison 
government or being taken forward at this 
admittedly early stage of post-COVID recovery.  
The considerably different lived experiences in 
day-to-day life during the pandemic, in social 
activity, work and business, are more likely to be 
sustained in the longer term. In particular, personal 
hygiene and distancing behaviour as well as 
technology-enabled activities of shopping, 
entertainment, access to health care and education, 
and working from home, reduced commuting and 
travel, lower energy use. These might be 
characterized as niche innovations but with some 
potential to develop into long-term sustainable 
changes with an accelerated move to an online 
economy. 
Having closed the long-standing and growing 
institutional, political, and democratic ―trust deficit‖ 
during the pandemic, will the Australian political 
classes and in particular, the Prime Minister and his 
government, take the opportunity created by 
the COVID crisis to build a new future? Or will they 
revert to type, to their previous political practices 
and culture, politicised squabbling and ideology, 
advancing vested interests against the public good, 
lacking transparency and accountability, and 
dividing rather than unifying behind a common 
purpose of ―public good‖?  
As Australia‘s successful crisis-management 
response to COVID-19 has underlined, sustainable 
democratic governance requires the careful balancing 
of capacity with legitimacy built on common purpose 
and public trust. It is clear by comparison between 
Australia on the one hand and the USA and the UK on 
the other that capacity alone is necessary but not 
sufficient; it must be complemented by legitimacy, 
public trust, leadership, and social cohesion.  
The necessary nature of the legitimacy 
dimensions determines the effectiveness with which 
capacity can be deployed. Furthermore, legitimacy 
appears to be importantly determined by 
the severity of restrictions proportional to capacity; 
more capacity should require less severe restrictions 
than lower levels of capacity.  
The essentially cultural features of a society are 
fundamental in successful pandemic management. 
The stronger the social cohesion or social capital 
the more resilient and accepting of emergency 
restrictions tailored to health system capacity.  
The Australian experience leaves us with 
an intriguing residual question: why did 
a conservative, small government PM feel able to 
make such a U-turn in his government‘s ideological, 
governance, economic and social policy positions in 
the country‘s successful response to COVID-19? 
He also delivered on COVID-19 even allowing for 
the primary service delivery responsibilities and 
roles exercised by state governments. The UK and 
the USA leaders did not and with tragic results. 
Could the difference lie in the relative strengths of 
cohesion and solidarity of the respective societies 
and the pressures that put on governments to act 
accordingly? Would Australians have politically 
accepted nothing less from their government, of 
whatever political allegiance? Was the change 
of allegiance vindicated by the accompanying surge 
in Morrison‘s personal popularity and levels of trust 
in government? 
Looking forward from the COVID-19 2020 crisis 
management experience, one thing that seems clear 
is that across the board there is no ―going back to 
normal‖. Disruption will accelerate, politics will 
become more turbulent, pandemic habits will 
persist, and crises will create opportunities. Effective 
and sustainable governance in confronting crises 
and emergencies is a matter of ethical and moral 
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